The absence of formal state structures for the conduct of cultural relations until 1938 has led to the assumption that Americans abandoned a noble tradition of liberal cultural exchange in the Cold War, when state and private organizations co-operated in a propaganda battle against the Soviet Union. This article re-examines the realities of American cultural diplomacy in inter-war Europe by focusing on a group of key actors: philanthropic foundations founded by the Rockefeller and the Carnegie families. Far from being apolitical, foundations operated with the tacit approval of the state and reliably furthered American interests abroad but their nongovernmental status also made them vulnerable to foreign intelligence.
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The American State Department, however, only set up its Division of Cultural Relations in July 1938, mainly as a reaction to Axis cultural propaganda in Latin America.
Nevertheless, for the next ten years, the newly created division held up the voluntarist traditions of the private cultural relations establishment. However, in the course of the Second World War, and as international politics became realigned into the bipolar power structures of the Cold War, the United States adopted a 'European-style' -Kulturpolitik which ultimately led to the hypocrisies of the Cultural Cold War. By 1950, American cultural diplomacy had moved from internationalism to nationalism and from private to public. It had turned international organizations like U.N.E.S.C.O. into a mouthpiece for American policies.
Finally, it mobilized independent liberal thinkers for the ideological combat against communism. Intellectual relations became politicized and thus poisoned and the noble American tradition of free cultural exchange was lost. 11 This is the standard account, which, however, betrays its Cold War vantage point. It implies that all those American groups involved in cultural relations before 1938 were really very good internationalists and part of an authentic, free-flowing, cross-cultural exchange into which politics rarely intruded. This, according to Ninkovich, changed because totalitarian regimes forced the United States to embrace European-style cultural policies. By framing the debate in this way, Ninkovich idealizes the unofficial conduct of cultural relations that went on in the inter-war years and leads us towards some intriguing conclusions.
First, Ninkovich seems to imply that private cultural diplomacy, run by nongovernmental organizations, is non-political and somehow possesses more democratic legitimacy than cultural diplomacy forged by states. Second, he also imagines a European tradition of Kulturpolitik which is supposedly completely different from the American approach. Apart from the fact that Ninkovich's characterization of European cultural foreign policies is problematic -private groups within the educated bourgeoisie were often at the origin of state policies, in Europe as in the United States 12 -one wonders how the supposedly voluntarist American approach could have worked if it used the same channels as European state-led organizations. At a basic level, we should challenge the notion that because of the late onset of the governmental management of international cultural relations in the United
States 'The US was a newcomer to culture wars' in the Cold War, as Tony Judt has claimed. 13 Thus, it seems necessary to have a closer look at American cultural relations in the inter-war years. Whether we can label these various initiatives and groups as 'cultural diplomacy' is up for discussion. Is something only worthy of the label diplomacy if state bureaucrats are directly involved? Or is it more valuable to analyse how cultural programmes actually worked on the ground, and how they were received in other countries? Is the publicprivate distinction really so important? Can the 'non-political, private' status of certain organizations not be part and parcel of official foreign policy? This article will explore these questions by focusing on two prominent philanthropic foundations, the Carnegie Endowment travelled eastwards. 27 The American relief workers who tested progressive models in townplanning, public health and education on war-devastated French civilians were the harbingers of this role reversal. 28 Foundations were major financiers of American war relief in Europe, We desire to avoid undue publicity. We work with many countries and it is our policy to keep the Foundation and its personnel in the background. It would seriously interfere with our work if it were regarded as a form of nationalistic propaganda. We shall count, therefore, upon your co-operation in helping us to avoid anything which might seem to involve us in international politics or might prove embarrassing to our work throughout the world. 35 In effect, in this letter Vincent asked for governmental co-operation to produce the appearance of non-co-operation. The unspoken assumption was that some level of state-private coordination was expected but should be denied publicly. This is underlined by Vincent's promise to keep Houghton informed: 'Our representatives when they go to Berlin will make a point of calling upon you and letting you know how things are going.' 36 Not all foundation officers were so cautious, What were the attitudes of the foundations towards Europe? What were they hoping to achieve through their expensive programmes and how did they go about it? One chief feature of inter-war foundation policy is that it was relatively decentralized. Service with the American Expeditionary Forces and was converted to a permanent institution in 1920. 56 Apart from offering American books to interested readers, the library also ran a school for those who wanted to learn about American methods of librarianship. The school's student body comprised twenty-three different nationalities and in a letter of the library to its American constituents, the potential impact of this spreading of American librarianship was highlighted:
[SMALL TYPE FULL OUT]In art, in literature, in drama, America has followed foreign models; in formal education she has built on Continental systems; but in library service the nations of the world are looking to America for leadership. Because of this, public library service has come to be regarded as a prime factor in the establishment of international harmony. 57 In the mid nineteen-twenties, the Carnegie Endowment planned to integrate its own operations with that of the library, and to transform it into a major cultural centre for American culture on the Left Bank, which would be, according to Earle Babcock, head of the Endowment's European office and president of the library's board, 'a focal point for the spread of American cultural influence not only in France but throughout Europe'. 58 In its own pamphlets, the library used the softer language of goodwill and mutual understanding between nations, describing its purpose as follows: 'to assist towards a better understanding of American life, literature, and habits of thought and to promote mutual comprehension and good-will.' The fact that it was privately-run also received a special mention: 'The money necessary to maintain the Service comes for the most part from individual Americans who are desirous of assisting in promoting international understanding and believe this to be the most effective way of doing it.' 59 As a result of a lack of funds, the Carnegie Endowment's plans for the library were The interest of American foundations in libraries did not just revolve around the kind of knowledge that such repositories would provide to European readers but also around the way knowledge was stored, organized and displayed. 63 The problem with American library methods, notably the system of open stacks, however, was that it was much more costly than Despite the United States' non-membership in the league, Sweetser felt that in this matter 'We want the right to vote. We have not that right at present and don't deserve it. But, if we put something into the Library, it would be accorded to us as gladly as in matters of health it is accorded to the Rockefeller Foundation'. 66 Sweetser alluded, of course, to the large contributions that the Rockefeller Foundation made to the league's Health Organization. As for the league library, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial did indeed support it with a grant of $30,000 which was, however, channelled through the American Library Association.
The memorial's name was not to be mentioned. 67 Apparently, a professional association of librarians was deemed to be the most appropriate sponsor for the League of Nations Library. where they had studied (very often in Germany), whether they had held government office, whether they were influential in the American press, and who their spouses and friends were. 75 This information was most likely also known to the German Foreign Ministry's Kulturabteilung, which regularly conferred with foundation fellowship advisers. 76 79 This strategy worked. 80 The Rockefeller Foundation, with its stronger emphasis on academic research, was not as susceptible to such manipulations, but in the field of international relations, one of its main programmes in the nineteen-thirties, its ambitions to forge a transnational academic consensus on certain international problems were also frustrated.
In the nineteen-thirties, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace gave considerable financial support to the International Studies
Conference, a series of annual conferences on international affairs under the auspices of the League of Nations' International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. 81 They provided an international forum for the contemporary intellectual elite involved in international studies. and headed a Nazi foreign affairs brain trust. 84 In fact, there is evidence in German archives that Ribbentrop specifically sent Berber to the conferences and to preparatory meetings to use them as a propaganda platform. 85 The American foundations not only accepted Berber's presence at the International Studies Conferences, some of their officers actively encouraged it in a misguided attempt to strengthen so-called 'moderate elements' in Germany. 86 As for the conferences themselves, under the direction of the foundations they were completely transformed between 1928 and 1931 from an annual meeting where academics discussed mostly technical matters, into para-diplomatic conferences with a common theme, designed to 'focus the attention of the various governments of Europe', as one Rockefeller officer remarked. 87 For the Rockefeller Foundation this also represented an opportunity to institutionalize research networks between the foreign affairs institutes it had started to support in the nineteen-twenties. The foundation intervened in numerous ways in the running of the International Studies Conference, wresting control away from the institute in Paris and thereby weakening the intergovernmental foundations of the conference. The intention behind this was to convene a pan-European body of experts which could also include scholars from states that had withdrawn from the league. In reality, though, scholars from dictatorships, such as Berber, found it easy to penetrate these nongovernmental structures -he simply posed as a private scholar even though in reality he was a Nazi spy. 88 After the fall of France, Berber was put in charge of the International Institute for Intellectual Co-operation in Paris, where he presided over the theft and subsequent transfer to Germany of many of the institute's files relating to the International Studies Conference. 89 When it came to cultural relations, American foundations wanted to have their cake and eat it.
They benefited from the comparative flexibility, nimbleness and prestige that international nongovernmental organizations were able to claim for themselves but they also enjoyed the spring 1926) ). 19 The relationship between these institutions and American foundations is analysed in K.
